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Fri, 03 Jul 2015
There are two boxes on a table, one red and one green. One contains a treasure. The red box is labelled "exactly one of the labels is true". The green box is labelled "the treasure is in this box."It's not too late to try to solve this before reading on. If you want, you can submit your answer here:
66.52% 300 red 25.72 116 not-enough-info 3.55 16 green 2.00 9 other 1.55 7 spam 0.44 2 red-with-qualification 0.22 1 attack 100.00 451 TOTAL
One-quarter of respondents got the right answer, that there is not enough information given to solve the problem, Two-thirds of respondents said the treasure was in the red box. This is wrong. The treasure is in the green box.
What?Let me show you. I stated:
The treasure is definitely not in the red box.
So if you said the treasure must be in the red box, you were simply mistaken. If you had a logical argument why the treasure had to be in the red box, your argument was fallacious, and you should pause and try to figure out what was wrong with it.
I will discuss it in detail below.
SolutionThe treasure is undeniably in the green box. However, correct answer to the puzzle is "no, you cannot figure out which box contains the treasure". There is not enough information given. (Notice that the question was not “Where is the treasure?” but “Can you figure out…?”)
(Fallacious) Argument AMany people erroneously conclude that the treasure is in the red box, using reasoning something like the following:
What's wrong with argument A?Here are some responses people commonly have when I tell them that argument A is fallacious:
"If the treasure is in the green box, the red label is lying."Not quite, but argument A explicitly considers the possibility that the red label was false, so what's the problem?
"If the treasure is in the green box, the red label is inconsistent."It could be. Nothing in the puzzle statement ruled this out. But actually it's not inconsistent, it's just irrelevant.
"If the treasure is in the green box, the red label is meaningless."Nonsense. The meaning is plain: it says “exactly one of these labels is true”, and the meaning is that exactly one of the labels is true. Anyone presenting argument A must have understood the label to mean that, and it is incoherent to understand it that way and then to turn around and say that it is meaningless! (I discussed this point in more detail in 2007.)
"But the treasure could have been in the red box."True! But it is not, as you can see in the pictures. The puzzle does not give enough information to solve the problem. If you said that there was not enough information, then congratulations, you have the right answer. The answer produced by argument A is incontestably wrong, since it asserts that the treasure is in the red box, when it is not.
"The conditions supplied by the puzzle statement are inconsistent."They certainly are not. Inconsistent systems do not have models, and in particular cannot exist in the real world. The photographs above demonstrate a real-world model that satisfies every condition posed by the puzzle, and so proves that it is consistent.
"But that's not fair! You could have made up any random garbage at all, and then told me afterwards that you had been lying."Had I done that, it would have been an unfair puzzle. For example, suppose I opened the boxes at the end to reveal that there was no treasure at all. That would have directly contradicted my assertion that "One [box] contains a treasure". That would have been cheating, and I would deserve a kick in the ass.
But I did not do that. As the photograph shows, the boxes, their colors, their labels, and the disposition of the treasure are all exactly as I said. I did not make up a lie to trick you; I described a real situation, and asked whether people they could diagnose the location of the treasure.
(Two respondents accused me of making up lies. One said:
There is no treasure. Both labels are lying. Look at those boxes. Do you really think someone put a treasure in one of them just for this logic puzzle?What can I say? I did put a treasure in a box just for this logic puzzle. Some of us just have higher standards.)
"But what about the labels?"Indeed! What about the labels?
The labels are worthlessThe labels are red herrings; the provide no information. Consider the following version of the puzzle:
There are two boxes on a table, one red and one green. One contains a treasure.Obviously, the problem cannot be solved from the information given.
Now consider this version:
There are two boxes on a table, one red and one green. One contains a treasure. The red box is labelled "gcoadd atniy fnck z fbi c rirpx hrfyrom". The green box is labelled "ofurb rz bzbsgtuuocxl ckddwdfiwzjwe ydtd."One is similarly at a loss here.
(By the way, people who said one label was meaningless: this is what a meaningless label looks like.)
There are two boxes on a table, one red and one green. One contains a treasure. The red box is labelled "exactly one of the labels is true". The green box is labelled "the treasure is in this box."The point being that in the absence of additional information, there is no reason to believe that the labels give any information about the contents of the boxes, or about labels, or about anything at all. This should not come as a surprise to anyone. It is true not just in annoying puzzles, but in the world in general. A box labeled “fresh figs” might contain fresh figs, or spoiled figs, or angry hornets, or nothing at all.
Why doesn't every logic puzzle fall afoul of this problem?I said as part of the puzzle conditions that there was a treasure in one box. For a fair puzzle, I am required to tell the truth about the puzzle conditions. Otherwise I'm just being a jerk.
Typically the truth or falsity of the labels is part of the puzzle conditions. Here's a typical example, which I took from Raymond Smullyan's What is the name of this book? (problem 67a):
… She had the following inscriptions put on the caskets:Notice that the problem condition gives the suitor a certification about the truth of the labels, on which he may rely. In the quotation above, the certification is in boldface.
A well-constructed puzzle will always contain such a certification, something like “one label is true and one is false” or “on this island, each person always lies, or always tells the truth”. I went to What is the Name of this Book? to get the example above, and found more than I had bargained for: problem 70 is exactly the annoying boxes problem! Smullyan says:
Good heavens, I can take any number of caskets that I please and put an object in one of them and then write any inscriptions at all on the lids; these sentences won't convey any information whatsoever.(Page 65)
Had I known ahead of time that Smullyan had treated the exact same topic with the exact same example, I doubt I would have written this post at all.
But why is this so surprising?I don't know.
Final notes16 people correctly said that the treasure was in the green box. This has to be counted as a lucky guess, unacceptable as a solution to a logic puzzle.
One respondent referred me to a similar post on lesswrong.
I did warn you all that the puzzle was annoying.
I started writing this post in October 2007, and then it sat on the shelf until I got around to finding and photographing the boxes. A triumph of procrastination!
[ Addendum 20150911: Steven Mazie has written a blog article about this topic, A Logic Puzzle That Teaches a Life Lesson. ]
Wed, 01 Jul 2015
The annoying boxes puzzle
There are two boxes on a table, one red and one green. One contains a treasure. The red box is labelled "exactly one of the labels is true". The green box is labelled "the treasure is in this box."Starting on 2015-07-03, the solution will be here.
What to make of this?
Many answers are possible. The point of this note is to refute one particular common answer, which is that the whole thing is just meaningless.
This view is espoused by many people who, it seems, ought to know better. There are two problems with this view.
The first problem is that it involves a theory of meaning that appears to have nothing whatsoever to do with pragmatics. You can certainly say that something is meaningless, but that doesn't make it so. I can claim all I want to that "jqgc ihzu kenwgeihjmbyfvnlufoxvjc sndaye" is a meaningful utterance, but that does not avail me much, since nobody can understand it. And conversely, I can say as loudly and as often as I want to that the utterance "Snow is white" is meaningless, but that doesn't make it so; the utterance still means that snow is white, at least to some people in some contexts.
Similarly, asserting that the sentences are meaningless is all very well, but the evidence is against this assertion. The meaning of the utterance "sentence 2 is false" seems quite plain, and so does the meaning of the utterance "sentence 1 is true". A theory of meaning in which these simple and plain-seeming sentences are actually meaningless would seem to be at odds with the evidence: People do believe they understand them, do ascribe meaning to them, and, for the most part, agree on what the meaning is. Saying that "snow is white" is meaningless, contrary to the fact that many people agree that it means that snow is white, is foolish; saying that the example sentences above are meaningless is similarly foolish.
I have heard people argue that although the sentences are individually meaningful, they are meaningless in conjunction. This position is even more problematic. Let us refer to a person who holds this position as P. Suppose sentence 1 is presented to you in isolation. You think you understand its meaning, and since P agrees that it is meaningful, he presumably would agree that you do. But then, a week later, someone presents you with sentence 2; according to P's theory, sentence 1 now becomes meaningless. It was meaningful on February 1, but not on February 8, even though the speaker and the listener both think it is meaningful and both have the same idea of what it means. But according to P, as midnight of February 8, they are suddenly mistaken.
The second problem with the notion that the sentences are meaningless comes when you ask what makes them meaningless, and how one can distinguish meaningful sentences from sentences like these that are apparently meaningful but (according to the theory) actually meaningless.
The answer is usually something along the lines that sentences that contain self-reference are meaningless. This answer is totally inadequate, as has been demonstrated many times by many people, notably W.V.O. Quine. In the example above, the self-reference objection is refuted simply by observing that neither sentence is self-referent. One might try to construct an argument about reference loops, or something of the sort, but none of this will avail, because of Quine's example:
"snow is white" is false when you change "is" to "is not".Or similarly:
If a sentence is false, then its negation is true.Nevertheless, Quine's sentence is an antinomy of the same sort as the example sentences at the top of the article.
But all of this is peripheral to the main problem with the argument that sentences that contain self-reference are meaningless. The main problem with this argument is that it cannot be true. The sentence "sentences that contain self-reference are meaningless" is itself a sentence, and therefore refers to itself, and is therefore meaningless under its own theory. If the assertion is true, then the sentence asserting it is meaningless under the assertion itself; the theory deconstructs itself. So anyone espousing this theory has clearly not thought through the consequences. (Graham Priest says that people advancing this theory are subject to a devastating ad hominem attack. He doesn't give it specifically, but many such come to mind.)
In fact, the self-reference-implies-meaninglessness theory obliterates not only itself, but almost all useful statements of logic. Consider for example "The negation of a true sentence is false and the negation of a false sentence is true." This sentence, or a variation of it, is probably found in every logic textbook ever written. Such a sentence refers to itself, and so, in the self-reference-implies-meaninglessness theory, is meaningless. So too with most of the other substantive assertions of our logic textbooks, which are principally composed of such self-referent sentences about properties of sentences; so much for logic.
The problems with ascribing meaninglessness to self-referent sentences run deeper still. If a sentence is meaningless, it cannot be self-referent, because, being meaningless, it cannot refer to anything at all. Is "jqgc ihzu kenwgeihjmbyfvnlufoxvjc sndaye" self-referent? No, because it is meaningless. In order to conclude that it was self-referent, we would have to understand it well enough to ascribe a meaning to it, and this would prove that it was meaningful.
So the position that the example sentences 1 and 2 are "meaningless" has no logical or pragmatic validity at all; it is totally indefensible. It is the philosophical equivalent of putting one's fingers in one's ears and shouting "LA LA LA I CAN'T HEAR YOU!"
the article on "dialetheism" in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition); for fullest details, see Priest's book In Contradiction.